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Abstract
This paper studies the distribution of income within neighborhoods and contrasts it with the
national income distribution. It relies on a unique feature of the American Housing Survey, whose
1985, 1989 and 1993 waves of interviews provide data for small residential neighborhoods. These
consist of a dwelling unit and up to ten of its nearest neighbors. Most previous work on neighbor-
hoods has used information for much larger groupings of the population, such as census tracts. The
paper employs a variety of parametric and nonparametric econometric tools to study income sorting
across US residential neighborhoods. It documents the patterns of dependence among neighbors’
income and imperfect sorting, with moderate but very signiﬁcant correlation among incomes of
neighbors and of considerable income mixing in U.S. neighborhoods.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D31, C14.
Keywords: income distribution, neighborhood eﬀects, neighborhood sorting, nonlinear kernel esti-
mation.
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Research in economics and sociology has examined whether or not U.S. residential areas exhibit
much more sorting by income, relative to what would occur if households were randomly drawn
from the national income distribution and assigned to communities. This question has motivated
a vast amount of research, especially starting with Tiebout (1956), who sought to explain the
endogenous formation of communities in economies where local government use taxes to provide
for public services. Individuals are seen to sort themselves into communities according to their
willingness to pay for local public services. More recently, attention has been directed to the role of
sorting in the reproduction of economic inequality. Prominent theoretical contributions in this area
are by Durlauf (1996) and Benabou (1996), who study community formation jointly with human
capital in the presence of social spillovers. Among empirical contributions, a notable one is by
Kremer (1997), who shows that although parents’ education and the mean education of residents
of census tracts where their children grew up are important determinants of children’s education,
the estimated parameters are not large enough for residential sorting by education (and income)
to contribute substantially to the dispersion of education within the population.
While the literature on Tiebout sorting, or at least the theoretical one, has been able to explain
stratiﬁcation according to income across communities, it has not provided a natural benchmark
against which to evaluate the extent of stratiﬁcation and has predicted, in a sense, too much
stratiﬁcation. Recent attempts to remedy this include Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg
(1999). Epple and Platt show that if individuals diﬀer with respect to income and to a preference
parameter, then the resulting sorting at equilibrium is partial but incomplete. Individuals with
identical incomes may be found in diﬀerent communities at equilibrium, which broadly accords with
the facts. Epple and Sieg estimate a model somewhat along the lines of Epple and Platt. They show
that when income and a preference characteristic are assumed to vary across the population, then
individuals sort themselves across communities, which are characterized by an ascending bundles
property: communities may be ranked in terms of incomes, housing prices and community-speciﬁc
public services. The most recent empirical work on Tiebout sorting by Hoyt and Rosenthal (1997)
rejects the strict implications of Tiebout sorting that all individuals in a particular community
would derive the same marginal beneﬁt from local public goods.
1Imperfect sorting across communities is consistent with a variety of motives. The extent in
which it rests on preferences for public services is important for designing public policy. For exam-
ple, local communities, state governments and even the U.S. government have staked out positions
on the desirability of income (and ethnic) mixing in residential patterns and adopted policies to
promote them. It matters for policy whether or not individuals want to be near others with par-
ticular characteristics. Communities are made up of smaller neighborhoods, whose characteristics
(like patterns of building density and availability of amenities, etc.) and appeal are essential to
determining the character of a community. This paper is also motivated by the fact that very little
is known about income distributions at the microscopic level of residential neighborhoods.
Hardman and Ioannides (1998) provide a qualitative description of sorting and mixing by income
in the immediate neighborhoods surrounding a randomly chosen sample of urban dwellers. They use
the neighborhood clusters data of the American Housing Survey for 1985 and 1993, which include
information on the characteristics of ten closest neighbors of the basic random sample. Using
U.S. government deﬁnitions of income categories, Hardman and Ioannides ﬁnd that low income
households are widely represented within these micro-neighborhoods: very low and extremely low
income households are present, for example, in almost nine- tenths of all US neighborhoods. In
three out of ﬁve neighborhoods sampled, the poorest two or three households (out of ten) come
from the poorest 30 % of the population. High income households (the richest 30 %) are widely
distributed. They are present in almost three fourths of all neighborhoods, and are represented by
at least two or three households out of ten in about two in about two ﬁfths of all neighborhoods.
Mayer (1996) contrasts changes in inequality in urban areas using micro data from the March CPS.
The importance of such a microscopic scale of analysis is highlighted by the work of Thomas
Schelling [ Schelling (1971; 1978) ]. Schelling studies spatial social structure, that is, the spatial
outcomes that are possible where diﬀerent individuals diﬀer with respect to their preference for the
characteristics of their immediate neighbors. Schelling’s theory explains how individuals’ interaction
in their immediate neighborhoods can be responsible for key features of entire urban communities.
Neighbor-to-neighbor interactions can have large-scale consequences, because they can lead to chain
reactions. One household moves for its own reasons, but if its move tips some balance, it may cause
others to move, too. As a result, a variety of stable and unstable spatial outcomes are possible. In
2contrast, Tiebout sorting of individuals into communities rests on preferences with respect to local
public goods.
Schelling’s model provides valuable theoretical underpinnings for the intuitive insight and grow-
ing body of evidence that immediate proximity is an important element of the social fabric of U.S.
cities. To understand patterns of mixing at larger scales, and to assess the feasibility and potential
impact of deliberate policies aimed at income mixing, we clearly need also to examine mixing at
smaller scales.
This paper aims at a better understanding of the distribution of income within neighborhoods
and its relationship with the national income distribution. Neighborhoods in this paper are loosely
deﬁned to the smallest reasonable scale for which data are available: they consist of a dwelling
unit and up to its ten nearest neighbors. Most previous work on neighborhoods has relied on cen-
sus tracts as a concept of neighborhood. Census tracts comprise much larger population groups,
that is 3500 to 5000 inhabitants. If individuals diﬀer with respect to many characteristics, ob-
served imperfect sorting would be consistent with diﬀerent behavioral patterns. Sorting according
to income is particularly interesting, as income is a central ingredient of economic models. Yet,
economics research to date provides little or no direct guidance regarding sorting into small neigh-
borhoods. Therefore, additional structure and, possibly, speciﬁc assumptions must be made about
individuals’s preferences over the characteristics of their neighbors. Diﬀerences among households
with respect to income may simply be due diﬀerences in life cycle stages diﬀerent households are
found. Clearly, neighborhoods may be mixed in terms of people of diﬀerent ages, whose current
incomes diﬀer because they happen to be on diﬀerent points in their life cycles and but whose
permanent incomes might diﬀer by less. Still, such diﬀerences are factors that aﬀect the character
of neighborhoods.
Our results reveal the importance of accounting for neighbor selection bias. The samples of
kernels and neighbors are not very diﬀerent, when considered separately. If income data for kernels
and neighbors are used simultaneously, then the extent of income mixing in neighborhoods is
obscured and confused with dispersion of incomes across the entire economy. Our results show that
treating kernels and neighbors alike, even while allowing for stochastic dependence across kernels
and their neighbors, exaggerates national income inequality and confuses it with neighborhood
3income mixing. By allowing for incomes of neighbors to have diﬀerent dispersion characteristics
than the national income distribution, while controlling for the income of a typical neighbor, we
may measure the outcome of neighborhood selection, i.e. sorting, in a reduced form fashion. We
ﬁnd, for example, that the correlation coeﬃcient between incomes of a randomly chosen individual
and her neighbors is, at around 0.3, moderate but statistically very signiﬁcant. When the sets of
neighbors’ incomes are deﬁned as conditional on those of their neighbor in common, then the data
do support the notion that neighbors’ incomes are dependent on those of their common neighbor,
and very signiﬁcantly, although weakly, correlated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of neigh-
borhood sorting and Section 3 the econometric models. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5
presents the results and 6 concludes.
2 The Sorting Model
Let I denote a set comprising of all individual members of the economy at some point in time,
possibly very large and therefore represented by a continuum, and let I denote the total population
of the economy at the corresponding time, I = jIj: Time is not essential in our analysis, because
we work with repeated cross sections and do not attempt to link the observations over time. We
ﬁx ideas and set notation as follows.
Let F(y) denote the distribution function of household income y in the entire economy. Suppose
the population is distributed into K diﬀerent geographical areas, to be referred to as neighborhoods,
Ik; k = 1;:::;K; each with population Ik = jIkj; and neighborhood-speciﬁc income distribution
function Fk; k = 1;:::;K; with support Ik(y): By deﬁnition, the decomposition of the population
into neighborhoods ie exhaustive, so that I =
SK
k=1 Ik: In that case, the economy-wide, national,
distribution of income among individuals, the national income distribution, is given by:
F(y) =
K X
k=1
Ik
I
Fk(y); (1)
from which the density function follows by diﬀerentiation.
We say that the national income distribution exhibits perfect mixing, if all neighborhood income
4distributions are identical to the national one, that is, if Equ. (1) implies:
Fk(y) ´ F(y); 8k and 8y: (2)
It exhibits perfect sorting, if the supports of the neighborhood income distributions do not overlap:
Ik1(y)
T
Ik2(y) = ;: E.g., in the simplest possible case where the Fk(y)’s are degenerate, then:
Fk(y) = 1;if y = yk; Fk(y) = 0;if y 6= yk;8k; (3)
and where all the yk’s are all diﬀerent. In that case, the national income distribution will be
described by the discrete frequency distribution f(yk; Ik
I ) : k = 1;:::;K:g:
2.1 The Epple–Sieg Model of Sorting
We use the basic model in Epple and Sieg (1999) to seek key characteristics of neighborhood
income distributions that are associated with the general case of imperfect sorting of individuals
into neighborhoods. The sorting model may be analyzed in terms of the standard tools of sample
selection bias. Yet, it is the associated income distributions that have not really been analyzed
in full detail. This is in part due to the fact that the econometric literature has sought to obtain
suitable estimators for problems that are subject to sample selection bias rather than to identify
the statistical characteristics of the associated income distributions. In a sense, this paper looks at
estimates of magnitudes which sample selection correction considers auxiliary to the main task of
correcting for selection bias.
We assume that all individuals make decisions at the same time about where to locate among
k = 1;:::;K neighborhoods. Individuals’ preferences are deﬁned in terms of their indirect utility
functions, as functions of individual income y; of the price of housing in neighborhood k, Pk; an
observable variable in principle, and of a quality attribute of the neighborhood, the state of the
neighborhood, gk: Following Epple and Sieg (1999), we assume an indirect utility function for a
household with income y residing in neighborhood k; as a function of (y;Pk;gk) of the form:
V (y;Pk;gk;²) ´
2
4²g
Ã
k +
"
exp
Ã
y1¡º ¡ 1
1 ¡ º
!
exp
Ã
¡B
P
´+1
k ¡ 1
1 + ´
!#Ã3
5
1
Ã
; (4)
where ² > 0; is an individual characteristic, that is distributed across the population, possibly
5jointly with income y; Ã < 0; ´ < 0; º > 0;and B > 0 are parameters which are constant across
all agents.
To see how the assumption about preferences according to (4) serves to clarify sorting across
neighborhoods, we may consider “indirect indiﬀerence” curves in (Pk;gk) space. Their slopes given
by:
@P
@g
jV =const =
²gÃ¡1
·
exp
³
y1¡º¡1
1¡º
´
exp
µ
¡B
P
´+1
k ¡1
1+´
¶¸¡Ã
Bp´ > 0: (5)
These curves are essential in characterizing neighborhood sorting for the following reason. Since
they are monotonic in y and ²; they satisfy the single-crossing property with respect to income, y;
and to the taste parameter, ²; given y: As Epple and Sieg, op. cit., show, this property is crucial for
obtaining separating equilibria, with respect to both income, y and the taste parameter, ²: To see
this intuitively, consider the indirect indiﬀerence curves for two values of income, y0; y00; y0 < y00;
with the same value of ²: As the indiﬀerence curve for y00 cuts the one for y0 from below, individuals
with incomes equal to y00 are willing to bid a higher value to locate in any particular community, cet.
par..2 Therefore, a neighborhood with higher value of Pk; holding gk constant, would be populated
by households with higher incomes.
We index the K neighborhoods in individuals’ opportunity sets, so that: dk < dk+1; Pk <
Pk+1; k = 0;:::;K ¡ 1: According to Epple and Sieg, op. cit. p. 651, there must be an ordering
of communities that must be conﬁrmed at equilibrium. 3 We assume that this indexing coincides
with the equilibrium ordering. We work out the speciﬁcs of selection which is likely to emerge
under preferences (4). Next we seek to characterize the marginal density function for neighborhood
k, fk(`ny) in terms of the joint distribution of preferences characteristics and income, (y;²); across
the population.
The set of individuals j 2 Ik who reside in neighborhood k are characterized by the set of values
(yj;²j) such that:
V (yj;Pk¡1;gk¡1;²j) < V (yj;Pk;gk;²j) · V (yj;Pk+1;gk+1;²j): (6)
We follow Epple and Sieg (1999) but simplify by setting º = 1 in which case limº=1 :
³
y1¡º¡1
1¡º
´
=
2The single-crossing property in the context of residential sorting was introduced by Ellickson (1991).
3This ordering must satisfy boundary indiﬀerence, income stratiﬁcation, and ascending bundles. That is, if Pi > Pj;
then gi > gj; iﬀ neighborhood i is populated by higher income people than neighborhood j:
6`ny: It turns out that the boundary of neighborhoods k and k+1 in (y;²) space is the straight line
given by `n² ¡ Ã`ny = Ck: Conditions (6) are transformed into:
Ck¡1 + Ã`ny < `n² · Ck + Ã`ny; (7)
where the Ck’s are auxiliary variables deﬁned by
Ck ´ `n
0
@
exp
h
¡Ã
´+1(BP
´+1
k+1 ¡ 1)
i
¡ exp
h
¡Ã
´+1(BP
´+1
k ¡ 1)
i
g
Ã
k ¡ g
Ã
k+1
1
A;k = 1;:::;K ¡ 1: (8)
Note that Ck is increasing in gk and Pk: Our assumptions about the ranking of the K neighbor-
hoods imply that the Ck’s, which are functions of the (gk;Pk;gk+1;Pk+1)’s, satisfy Ck+1 > Ck: For
completeness, we deﬁne C0 = ¡1; and CK = 1: The proposition that follows summarizes the
implications of this model for the neighborhood income distributions. The proof of this proposition
is rather straightforward and has been relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let the distribution of (`ny;`n²) be bivariate normal with parameters (¹y;¹²;¸;¾y;¾²).
Part A. The distribution of income in neighborhood k, fk(`ny); is given by the marginal with respect
to `ny; multiplied by the probability that `n² lies within the bounds given in (7) conditional on
`ny: That is,
fk(`ny) =
1
Gk
1
p
2¼¾y
exp
Ã
¡
1
2
(`ny ¡ ¹y)2
¾2
y
!
¢ [Φ(Zk(y)) ¡ Φ(Zk¡1(y))]; (9)
where Φ(¢) denotes the cumulative standardized normal distribution function, the auxiliary variables
Zk¡1;Zk are deﬁned as
Zk(y) ´ Ωj + !`ny;
Ωk ´
Ck ¡ ¹² + ¸
¾²¹y
¾y
(1 ¡ ¸2)
1
2¾²
; (10)
! ´
1
(1 ¡ ¸2)
1
2
Ã
Ã
¾²
¡
¸
¾y
!
; (11)
and Gk is a normalizing constant, which is equal to the unconditional probability that an individual
be in neighborhood k:
Gk =
Z 1
¡1
1
p
2¼¾y
exp
Ã
¡
1
2
(`ny ¡ ¹y)2
¾2
y
!
¢ [Φ(Zk(y)) ¡ Φ(Zk¡1(y))]d`ny:
Part B. The income distribution in neighborhood k, fk(`ny); may under certain conditions be
bimodal.
7This result is interpreted as follows. Individual choices result in sorting into neighborhoods
consisting of individuals with income distributed within the neighborhood according to the un-
conditional national income distribution, scaled by the diﬀerence between two suitable deﬁned
cumulative normal distribution functions, Φ¤(`ny) ´ Φ(Zk(`ny))¡Φ(Zk¡1(`ny)): These functions,
if viewed as functions of `ny; may be plotted over the horizontal axis as two cumulative normal
distribution functions corresponding to standardized normal distributions centered at Ωk
¡! and
Ωk¡1
¡! :
The properties of Φ¤(`ny) as a function of `ny depend upon the sign of !: If the taste parameter
and income are positively correlated, ¸ > 0; then ! < 0; and the Zk’s are decreasing functions of
`ny: If, on the other hand, income and the taste parameter are negatively correlated, ¸ < 0; then
the sign of ! depends on the relative magnitudes of all parameters, and the Zk(`ny)’s can become
increasing functions of `ny:
If individuals do not diﬀer with respect to their evaluation of gk; then the sorting conditions
are simpliﬁed. Under the normalizing assumption ² = 1; the sorting conditions (7) become:
1
¡Ã
Ck¡1 < `ny ·
1
¡Ã
Ck: (12)
These inequalities deﬁne bounds in terms of `ny; and no integration with respect to ² is called for.
The resulting distributions may be described concicely by:
fS
k (`ny) =
f(`ny)
R Ck=¡Ã
Ck¡1=¡Ã f(`ny)d(`ny)
; k = 1;:::;K ¡ 1; (13)
where `ny lies in the interval deﬁned by (12). The neighborhood income distributions are simply
doubly truncated segments of the national distribution. They describe perfect sorting. If, on
the other hand, individuals’ evaluations of g diﬀer, the neighborhood income distributions extend
over the entire support of the national income distribution, even if income and the individual
preference characteristic are uncorrelated. As long as taste heterogeneity is present, and even if it
is uncorrelated with income, sorting according to income would be imperfect.
Careful inspection of the diﬀerence in the second term in the r.h.s. of (9) hints to the pos-
sibility that neighborhood income distributions could be bimodal. The weighting of the national
distribution is accentuated between Ck¡1 and Ck; with the no taste heterogeneity case being the
extreme case, where the distribution has mass only between the two bounds. However, the clus-
tering of incomes around the national mean suggests that a second mode may survive even after
8the national income distribution has been scaled down. This is clearly more likely to happen the
further the bounds are away from the national mean. We note that a straightforward consequence
of bimodality in this context would be that neighborhood distribution might have larger variance
than the national distribution.
The fact that neighborhood income distributions depend upon the Ck’s only is not a special
property of the model in the absence of individual taste heterogeneity. In fact, as Lemmata 1 and
2, Epple and Sieg, op. cit., p. 654 show, the Ck’s may be recursively deﬁned in terms of the
unconditional probabilities that individuals locate in neighborhoods k = 1;:::;K: In our notation,
if we normalize I to one, then
Ck = C(Ck¡1;Gkj¹y;¹²;¸;¾y;¾²); (14)
which along with C0 = ¡1; CK = 1; deﬁne fully the Ck’s. These auxiliary variables may be
rightly referred to as community-speciﬁc intercepts, and serve as suﬃcient statistics.
The analysis so far has taken prices as given. Ultimately, of course, prices are endogenous.
Given individual valuations of neighborhood conditions, individuals bid for the privilege in locat-
ing in diﬀerent neighborhoods. A complete analysis would require a more precise deﬁnition of a
neighborhood in terms of the housing stock. Other interesting aspects of the neighborhood location
problem, such as individuals’ taking into consideration the characteristics of others who also choose
to locate in the same neighborhood, also complicate the problem considerably. In the remainder
of the discussion in this paper, we take prices as given. In an eﬀort to account for variations in
housing prices across the US, we use the full detail of geographic information which is available in
our data in addition to incomes.
We note that the model of heterogeneous preferences introduced in (4) above may not be fully
identiﬁed from income distribution data alone. Nonetheless, the model serves to structure the
empirical investigation below.
3 Econometric Models
Suppose now that data are available in the form of a ﬁnite random sample of neighborhoods in the
economy. Let diﬀerent observations of neighborhoods be indexed by k; k = 1;:::;K: The sample
9is made up of observations on incomes of a random subsample of the entire national sample,
Yke = fyk : k = 1;:::;Kg, which may be treated as a representative sample drawn from the
national income distribution. Each observation k is known as the kernel of neighborhood k; and
ke is mnemonic for kernel. The AHS data provide information on the neighbors of each kernel. We
use j = 1;:::;n to index the sample of nearest neighbors to kernel k in her neighborhood, Ik: The
set of nearest neighbors of k in the data will be referred to as neighborhood cluster k. In practice,
the number of neighbors diﬀers across kernels because of missing values and changes in sampling
procedures. We return to this issue below.
This sampling procedure samples K neighborhoods, and conditional on a randomly chosen mem-
ber in each neighborhood, their n nearest neighbors. We shall, for simplicity, consider that neigh-
borhoods are spatially homogeneous groups, so that the samples Yk = fyk1;:::;ykng; k = 1;:::;K;
that is sets of random vectors drawn from the distribution function of incomes in neighborhood clus-
ters k = 1;:::;K: That is, Yk is a random vector of size n whose components are i.i.d., conditional
on yk; drawn from probability density function fk(ykjjyk);j = 1;:::;n: It will be useful to deﬁne,
for every neighborhood cluster k; the sample maximum and minimum, MAXk = maxj2Ikfykjg;
MINk = minj2IkfYkjg:
The distribution of income within each neighborhood, according to Proposition 1, and given
housing prices and the states of neighborhoods, depends on the parameters of the national income
distribution, of the distribution of the taste parameter evaluating the state of each neighborhood,
and on the remainder of preference characteristics. However, as mentioned above, the community-
speciﬁc intercepts help simplify the estimation problem. In principle, it should be possible to handle
the problem of estimating the neighborhood income distributions, that were deﬁned in Section 2
above, by means of maximum likelihood methods. Unfortunately, this direct approach did not
work.4
4I am truly grateful to Dennis Epple for his generosity in working out the following detailed suggestions. Since
a neighborhood is a very small share of the metropolitan population, the integral between the upper and lower
neighborhood boundaries for a given value of income can be written in terms of the density. Then, assuming all
neighborhoods are of the same size provides a normalization that can be exploited by completing the square of the
exponents of the likelihood function and then integrating over (¡1;1). In this fashion, a density of the sample
of income observations for a given neighborhood can be written, conditional on the unobserved community-speciﬁc
intercept. When neighborhoods are small and the sample of neighborhoods is randomly drawn, the community-speciﬁc
intercepts are normally distributed. This distribution permits integrating out the community-speciﬁc intercepts to
yield a likelihood function written in terms of observables and parameters to be estimated. It is very unfortunate that
maximum likelihood estimation along these lines did not work out for computational reasons, in spite of a relatively
10We therefore resort to use of class of parametric models as reduced-form approximations of the
true model. This approach can handle some important hypotheses derived from the theoretical
analysis and generally helps to further clarify the properties of neighborhood income distributions.
A particularly interesting hypothesis, derived from the theoretical analysis, is that neighborhoods
are imperfectly segregated in a manner that implies higher variance than the national income
distribution.
Sample design suggests that we could take as the maintained hypothesis that the incomes of
kernels in the data are a random sample from the national income distribution. We shall use upper
case Y from now on to denote log incomes. Let the distribution of log incomes among kernels,
Y = `ny; be normally distributed with mean and variance denoted, respectively, by ¹ke and &2:
Let the distribution of log incomes of neighbors also be normal but correlated with that of their
kernel, that is, let ¹ne; ¾2; ½ denote, respectively, the mean income of neighbors (mnemonic ne,
from neighbors), its variance, and the correlation coeﬃcient between incomes of neighbors and
kernels. We think such a speciﬁcation of the distribution of income of neighbors conditional on
that of their kernels follows the intuition that emanates from Proposition 1.
Conditional on the log income of the kernel of neighborhood k; Yk; the incomes of its neighbors
are normal with parameters (¹ne+½¾
& (Yk¡¹ke);¾2(1¡½2)): This allows us to write the log likelihood
function for a set of observations from neighborhood cluster k; (Yk;Yk1;:::;Ykn); as follows:
LLF(Yk;Yk) = ¡
1
2
"
(Yk ¡ ¹ke)2
&2 + `n[2¼&2]
#
¡
1
2
jnkj X
j=1
"
(Ykj ¡ ¹ne ¡ ½¾
& (Yk ¡ ¹ke))2
¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
+ `n[2¼¾2(1 ¡ ½2)]
#
(15)
¡
jnkj X
j=1
`n
"
Φ
Ã
(MAXk ¡ ¹ne ¡ ½¾
& (Yk ¡ ¹ke))
¾(1 ¡ ½2)
1
2
!
¡ Φ
Ã
(MINk ¡ ¹ne ¡ ½¾
& (Yk ¡ ¹ke))
¾(1 ¡ ½2)
1
2
!#
:
We note that maximum likelihood estimations with this model allows for data for both kernels and
neighbors to contribute to the estimated parameters of the national income distribution.
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the model whose log likelihood function is given
by Equ. (15) as Model 5. It serves as the most general case in our setting that nests a number
of simpler models that we may deﬁne. So, Model 0 is the case with equal means and variances
small number of parameters.
11across kernels and neighbors, ¹ke = ¹ne;¾2 = &2; no correlation, ½ = 0; and with the Φ(¢)’s not
present. Model 1 allows for correlation between kernels and neighbors, ½ 6= 0; but keeps all other
assumptions of Model 0. Model 2 allows for diﬀerent means and variances and nonzero correlation
between incomes of kernels and neighbors, ¹ke 6= ¹ne;¾2 6= &2;½ 6= 0, but the Φ(¢)’s are not present.
Model 3 corresponds to Model 0, except that the Φ(¢)’s are present, and Model 4 to Model 1, except
that Φ(¢)’s are present. Even though the Φ(¢)’s do not include additional unknowns, they do bring
into the estimation additional information associated with the observed lower and upper bounds
within each cluster and for each observation. The exact expressions for the likelihood functions for
each of the models 1—4 are given in Appendix B.
The generality of Model 5 is meant to account for possible biases inherent in using the clusters
data, that is to account for neighborhood selection and the dependence it implies among incomes
of kernels and neighbors. For example, if income data for kernels and neighbors are used simul-
taneously and there is dependence among neighbors’ incomes, then the extent of income mixing
in neighborhoods is obscured and confused with dispersion of incomes across the economy. Com-
parison of Models 1 and 2 suggests that treating kernels and neighbors alike, even while allowing
for stochastic dependence across kernels and their neighbors exaggerates national income inequal-
ity and confuses it with neighborhood income mixing. By allowing for incomes of neighbors to
have diﬀerent dispersion characteristics than the national income distribution we may measure the
outcome of neighborhood selection, i.e. sorting, in a reduced form fashion.
Next, after a brief discussion of the data, we present a nonparametric analysis of the neigh-
borhood cluster structure of the data and then follow up with parametric econometric analyses,
obtained with a variety of estimation methods. The ﬁrst part of our analysis of neighborhood
income distributions involves nonlinear estimations of neighbors’ incomes, conditional those of the
kernels. The second part is parametric estimation of that same pattern among incomes of neigh-
bors and their kernel when we allow for general dependence among all neighbors’ incomes, while
conditioning on their kernels’ incomes, by using seemingly unrelated regressions. The third part
involves parametric maximum likelihood estimations along the lines of Equ. (15). As we mentioned
above, such estimations adopt but simplify the neighborhood income distribution model articulated
by Proposition 1.
124 The Data
The AHS is a panel of housing units, which involves in its entirety more than 50,000 dwelling units
that are interviewed each two years, and serves the basis for US housing statistics. We explore a
somewhat neglected aspect of the data, data on neighborhood clusters, which are available only
for years 1985, 1989, and 1993. In those years only, a random sample of, respectively 670, 805,
and 1014 urban units were selected and for each one of them originally up to ten and later on
more neighbor units were interviewed. Each neighborhood cluster is deﬁned by its kernel and
includes all neighbors.5 Restricting attention to regular interviews only (that is those with an
actual household head) reduces the number of available points. 6 Also, additional units in existing
clusters were included in 1989 to reﬂect additional units that had been added within the perimeter
of the “neighborhood.” By 1993, a maximum of 20 neighboring units were allowed per cluster.7 In
view of the change in the number of observations over time, and after considerable experimentations,
we decided to conduct separate parametric estimations with data for neighborhood clusters that
include the same number of observations, that is n = 10 neighbors, for 1985, 1989 and 1993, which
is of course a subset of the data, as well as the full sample, in which the number of observations
may vary across neighborhoods. The nonparametric estimations, however, have been conducted
with the full data.
We should also note that by full data we mean the sample of owner occupants. We have
restricted this study to that sample for two main reasons. First, we wish to maintain comparability
among several studies of neighborhood eﬀects, such Ioannides (1999) and Ioannides and Zabel
(2000), for example. Second, renters and owners could employ very diﬀerent approaches to the
evaluation of neighborhoods where they wish to reside, in part because of diﬀerent time horizons,
with renters generally being younger and much more mobile. In spite of these limitations, our
data are quite representative of both the entire AHS data and national statistics for the US. This
5Only a handful of papers, that is, de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1995), Gabriel and Rosenthal (1995; 1996), Hoyt
and Rosenthal (1995), Hardman and Ioannides (1998), Ioannides (1999; 2000), Ioannides and Seslen (1999), Ioannides
and Zabel (2000), and Kiel and Zabel (1998) have utilized the AHS clusters data to date. Kiel and Zabel compare
the performance of clusters data against census tract level attributes by means of privileged access to census-tract
coding of the data. Ioannides (1999) aims at understanding neighborhood interactions in housing consumption and
maintenance decisions. Ioannides and Seslen (1999) merge AHS clusters data and PSID micro data to compare
neighborhood income and wealth distributions.
6See the Appendix in Ioannides (1999) for further details on the count of observations.
7I am grateful to Barbara T. Williams, US Bureau of the Census, for this clariﬁcation.
13established by Appendix C.
5 Results
We present in this part of the paper results according to the three stages of estimations outlined
above of statistical and econometric procedures to discern patterns in neighborhood income dis-
tributions. We order randomly the observations for each cluster into a vector of ten observations
and associate them with their kernel. We start by an examination of the importance of the cluster
structure of the data.
5.1 The Neighborhood Cluster Structure of the Data
We report ﬁrst estimated correlation coeﬃcient among neighbors, for each of the three waves of data,
1985, 1989 and 1993. The estimated correlation coeﬃcients, respectively, among the elements of
Yk across the data, Yk = fYk1;:::;Yk10g; k = 1;:::;K and between Yk; and fYk1;:::;Yk10g; k =
1;:::;K range uniformly between .3301 and .5268, and between .3499 and .4897, for 1985, between
.2465 and .4735, and between .3373 and .4528, for 1989, and between .2793 and .4940, and between
.3501 and .5192, for 1993.
Decomposing the variance of log incomes, separately for 1985, 1989 and 1993, in terms of cluster-
speciﬁc eﬀects, we ﬁnd that the cluster structure yields the following. For 1985, cluster ﬁxed eﬀects
explain 31% of variance, and cluster random eﬀects 25.9%; for 1989, cluster ﬁxed eﬀects explain 30%
of variance, and cluster random eﬀects 24.8%; and for 1993, cluster ﬁxed eﬀects explain 27.1% of
variance, and cluster random eﬀects 21.4%. In view of the fact that these estimations are conducted
with data from the entire US, it is quite surprising, at least to me, that only a small portion of the
variance is explained by cluster-speciﬁc eﬀects.
In this connection, let us recall the ﬁnding by Epple and Sieg (1999), p. 671, that 89% of the total
variance of income in the Boston metropolitan area is accounted for by within-community variance.
This leaves 11% of the variance to be explained by inter-community variance, the counterpart to our
14cluster-speciﬁc eﬀects. Our ﬁnding is, mutatis mutandis, 8 compatible with theirs, and especially
if one were to consider that a single metropolitan area (Boston) is most likely more homogeneous
than the entire US.
While the decomposition of variance gives a sense of the importance of income sorting, it would
be interesting to know how closely correlated incomes of neighbors are in a group sense. Such
a group correlation coeﬃcient has been used in the literature as a measure of segregation. See
Kremer (1997) and Kremer and Maskin (1996), who show that it may be computed as the R2
from a regression of incomes against a set of dummies for all clusters in the data.9 Our results
show that this correlation coeﬃcient is estimated at .3318, for 1985, .3220 for 1989 and .2915 for
1993. We repeated this estimation by using data from the metropolitan sample of the AHS for
1985, 1989 and 1993.10 The correlation coeﬃcient among inhabitants of the same census tract
was estimated for the following metro areas: Boston, MA; Dallas, TX; Detroit, MI; Forth Worth-
Arlington, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN; Philadelphia, PA; Phoenix, AZ; San
Francisco–Oakland, CA; Tampa–St. Petersburg, FL; and Washington, DC. The data here come
from the metropolitan sample of the AHS, which is completely diﬀerent from the national sample
used in the remainder of this analysis. For 1985, these estimated correlation coeﬃcients range from
a maximum of .3716, for Boston, to a minimum of .2493, for Tampa-St. Petersburg. For 1989,
these correlation coeﬃcients range from a maximum of .4436, for Washington DC, to a minimum
of .2504, for Tampa-St. Petersburg.
8The Epple–Sieg variance decomposition is deﬁned, in our notation and context, as:
var(Y ) =
K X
k=1
GkvarIk(Y ) +
K X
k=1
Gk[EIk(Y ) ¡ EI(Y )]
2:
With perfect sorting, the ﬁrst component would be relative small. The larger is the ﬁrst component relatively
to the total variance the more imperfect sorting is. Actually, the Epple–Sieg is cast in terms of the importance
of taste heterogeneity relative to income heterogeneity. If taste heterogeneity is more important relative to income
heterogeneity, community income distributions would be quite similar. Therefore, the ﬁnding that the ﬁrst component
is large relative to the second suggests that taste heterogeneity is more important than income as a determinant of
sorting across communities.
9The expression for this correlation coeﬃcient is:
Corr =
PK
k=1
Pjnkj
j=1(Ykj ¡ ¯ Y )
Pjnkj
i=1 (Yki ¡ ¯ Y )
1
nk PK
k=1
Pjnkj
i=1 (Ykj ¡ ¯ Y )2
:
10As an aside, this is a completely diﬀerent sample than the national one, from which the clusters data are drawn.
The metropolitan sample identiﬁes observations that belong to the same census tract but neither reveals the respective
census tract nor provides information on clusters, a feature of the national sample.
15We suggest that the general similarity of the estimates for the correlation of incomes within
tracts and within clusters implies that this analysis of this paper is not subject to the so-called
modiﬁable areal unit problem (MAUP) from geostatistics and statistical geography. That is, the
MAUP problem in spatial statistics concerns the inﬂuence of the level of aggregation (scale) within
which a spatial variable is sampled on relationships between any two (or more) spatial variables.
The recent statistical geography literature on MAUP emphasizes three diﬀerent ways to address the
diﬀerent scales problem, that is distinguishing between subsetting, stratiﬁcation and aggregation [
Cressie (1996), p. 167 ]. Working with samples of diﬀerent clusters within a census tract involves
stratiﬁcation, except that the “strata” have been randomly selected. On that score, it is encouraging
that the estimated correlation coeﬃcients from those very diﬀerent samples are so close to one
another, suggesting that neighborhood clusters are indeed representative random samples of census
tracts.
5.2 Nonparametric Estimations
We plotted the data and estimated nonparametric models for the univariate densities. We found
no evidence of bimodality in the data.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 report nonparametric estimates for the distributions of neighbors’ log incomes,
conditional on their kernel’s log income, f (Yk1;:::;Yk10jYk); respectively for 1985, 1989, and 1993.
The descriptive statistics for the data used in these estimations are given in Table 1.
Each of the ﬁgures reports three-dimensional pictures of estimated stochastic kernels as well as
their contours. Both are obtained by using Danny T. Quah’s tSrF package.11 The three-dimensional
ﬁgures, Figures 3, 5 and 7, are to be read as follows. The intersection of the surface drawn by a plane
perpendicular to the axis marked kernels yields the neighborhood income distribution, conditional
on the respective value of income for the kernel. The contour pictures, Figures 2, 4, and 6, are to
be read in the standard fashion for map contours.
Both, the three-dimensional kernels and the two-dimensional contours help clarify the process
of neighborhood sorting in US neighborhoods. To appreciate what they show, consider the two
extreme cases of, respectively, perfect mixing and perfect sorting, as deﬁned above. If US neigh-
11This is available from Danny T. Quah’s LSE web page at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/˜dquah/tsrf.html. See Quah
(1996) for a standard application.
16borhood income distributions reﬂected perfect mixing, then the stochastic kernels would have their
peaks lined up parallel to the kernel income axis. If US neighborhood income distributions reﬂected
perfect sorting, then the stochastic kernels would have their peaks lined up along the 45o line. As
the contour pictures clarify, the peaks of the conditional distributions line up along a line which
is steeper than 45o: This suggests imperfect sorting. The mode of the distribution of neighbors’
incomes increases less than proportionately with those of their kernels’. Careful observations of the
contour maps suggests that, generally, the variance of the income of neighbors conditional on the
income of kernels, declines with kernel income. It is interesting to consider adapting the estimation
so that to each kernel one associate the entire sample of neighbors’ incomes. This is accomplished
in a linear model by means of the regressions which follow.
5.3 Neighbors’ Incomes Conditional on Kernels’ Incomes
We report estimation results for seemingly unrelated regressions with a model of neighbors’ incomes
as a function of the respective kernel’s income, separately for each of the three waves of the data:
Y k = ® + ¯ Yk + ²k (16)
where ® is a 10-vector of intercepts and ¯ a 10-vector of coeﬃcients. We allow for general correlation
matrix for the 10-vector of stochastic shocks ²k:
The estimates of the components of ¯; with t statistics given in parentheses and ranging roughly
within similar bounds, range from .3809 (6.02) to .5276 (8.56), for 1985, from .3163 (5.15) to .4947
(9.33), for 1989, and from .2457 (4.13) to .4997 (8.72), for 1993. Interestingly, allowing for a
variable number of neighbors and thus extending the size of the data set does not reveal any
noticeable diﬀerences. The estimated correlation matrices for the ²k’s are generally smaller than
the raw ones, reported above, rather uniform and still diﬀerent from 0. They range from .2179 to
.3992, for 1985, from .1595 to .3570, for 1989, and from .1392 to .4041, for 1993. These results
are in broad agreement with the nonparametric estimation results reported in subsection 5.2 just
above. As we saw there, the mode of the distributions of neighbors’s incomes, conditional on those
of their kernels’ incomes, increases with the kernel’s income but by less than proportionately to it.
175.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimations of Neighborhood Income Distributions
An important feature of the parametric results with neighbors’ incomes conditional on those of their
kernels is that the correlations among all neighbors’ incomes do not diﬀer very much. We report
estimations with models that would hopefully provide additional intuition about the phenomenon
of the neighborhood income sorting. Speciﬁcally, Model 5, which is described in Section 3 above,
imposes a restricted structure of correlation relative to the model in section 5.3 above.
We report in Tables 2 – 7 maximum likelihood estimation results for the family of models, whose
loglikelihood functions are nested in Equ. (15). This stochastic structure allows for the incomes of
kernels and neighbors to have diﬀerent means and variances and the incomes of neighbors may be
correlated with those of their kernels.
We report in detail below in Table 2 the results for Models 0 – 5 for 1985. Model 0 below
imposes the same means and variances across kernels and neighbors. Model 1 allows, in addition,
for correlation between neighbors’ and kernels’ incomes. Model 2 allows the means to vary and also
allows for correlation between neighbors’ and kernels’ incomes. Models 3, 4 and 5 are like Models 0,
1, and 2, respectively, except that in addition the requirement is imposed that all data lie between
the observed minimum and maximum among the incomes in each neighborhood.
For each of these models, the second column in Table 2 reports, in addition, estimations for an
extended model where dummies are introduced to allow for the means of kernels and of neighbors
to vary according to four US Census regions, climatic regions, and categories of urbanicity. Such
an extended list of regressors is included in order to account for the fact that the determinants of
neighborhood sorting, according to the model presented in Section 2, may in general vary across
diﬀerent regions and geographic areas with diﬀerent density characteristics.
The results for 1989 are quite similar to those of 1985, but those for 1993 show some important
diﬀerences. The estimate of the correlation coeﬃcient is much smaller, at .163 (9.15), and the
variances of kernels and neighbors are much nearer one another, 1.511 (13.53) and 1.590 (104.31),
respectively. However, when the data are grouped by region and, alternatively, by category of
urbanicity the decrease in the correlation coeﬃcient is hard to explain.
Table 3 compares the results obtained with Model 5 for 1985, as reported in the last column
of Table 2, with those for 1989 and 1993. Comparison of the ﬁrst and third columns of that table
18suggests the coeﬃcient of variation of kernels’ incomes increases from .109 in 1985 to .126 in 1993,
while at the same time, income mixing decreases in neighborhoods, as the coeﬃcient of variation
of neighbors’ incomes decreases from .137 to .126. This pattern is also present when the stochastic
structure is allowed to be region-speciﬁc. Generally, means for kernels and neighbors are quite
close, but variances diﬀer considerably, except for 1993.
Tables 4 and 5 report the results obtained with Model 5 estimated separately for each of the
four regions in the data, for 1985 and 1993, respectively. From Tables 4 and 5, the coeﬃcient of
variation of log incomes of kernels increases from 1985 to 1993, for the Northeast and the South,
and income mixing in neighborhood decreases for all regions except the Midwest.
Tables 6 and 7 report the results obtained with Model 5 estimated separately for each of the four
groupings of the data according to degree of urbanicity, for 1985 and 1993, respectively. According
to these results, income inequality in central cities of metropolitan areas decreased from 1985 to
1993, with the respective coeﬃcient of variation of log incomes going from .138 to .103, but it
increased in the suburbs, with the respective coeﬃcient of variation going from .083 to .144. And
income mixing within neighborhoods decreased over the same period of time, in both central cities
and suburbs, with the respective coeﬃcient of variation going from .152 to .141, and from .102 to
.098, respectively.
The availability of separate estimations when we allow for the stochastic structure to vary by
region, as in Tables 4 and 5, and by urbanicity, as in Tables 6 and 7, prompts a number of remarks.
The diﬀerences between the variances of kernel and neighbor incomes appear to be eliminated when
we estimate separate models for the four regions, but remain quite pronounced when we estimate
separate models for the four types of urban areas. It would be interesting to reconcile our ﬁndings
with evidence of widening income segregation in urban areas along with a slight narrowing of racial
segregation and an increase in income inequality, as reported by Mayer (1996) on the basis of
diﬀerent data.12
12Mayer (1996) compares the central city concentration of families in each income quintile to the central city
concentration of the average family using CPS data for MSAs from 1964 to 1994. He shows that the ratio of the
central city percentage of families in the bottom quintile to the central city percentage of all families exhibits an
upward trend and the respective ratio for the top quintile exhibits an downward trend.
196 Conclusions
Our results reveal the importance of accounting for neighbor selection bias. The samples of ker-
nels and neighbors are not very diﬀerent, when considered separately. If income data for kernels
and neighbors are used simultaneously, then the extent of income mixing in neighborhoods is ob-
scured and confused with dispersion of incomes across the entire economy. Our results show that
treating kernels and neighbors alike, even while allowing for stochastic dependence across kernels
and their neighbors, exaggerates national income inequality and confuses it with neighborhood
income mixing. By allowing for incomes of neighbors to have diﬀerent dispersion characteristics
than the national income distribution, while controlling for the income of a typical neighbor, we
may measure the outcome of neighborhood selection, i.e. sorting, in a reduced form fashion. We
ﬁnd, for example, that the correlation coeﬃcient between incomes of a randomly chosen individual
and her neighbors is, at around 0.3, moderate but statistically very signiﬁcant. When the sets of
neighbors’ incomes are deﬁned as conditional on those of their neighbor in common, then the data
do support the notion that neighbors’ incomes are dependent on those of their common neighbor,
and very signiﬁcantly, although weakly, correlated. The estimated dispersion of incomes within
neighborhoods is signiﬁcantly larger than the dispersion of incomes of a randomly drawn sample of
the national population. In other words, income mixing, another way to express imperfect sorting,
is a real phenomenon.
While this possibility was anticipated by our theoretical discussion, which draws on a model by
Epple and Sieg, we believe that the ﬁndings reported here are the ﬁrst measurements of important
characteristics of income distributions within small US neighborhoods. It would be interesting to
see what these ﬁndings imply for the eﬀectiveness of programs deliberately designed to bring about
income mixing, such as Moving to Opportunity and others.
20TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics AHS Neighborhood Clusters Data: 1985, 1989, 1993
Year 1985 1989 1993
Number of clusters 232 244 310
Mean, Income of Kernels (current $) 30,610 40,779 41,530
Standard Deviation, Income of Kernels 24,113 40,091 33,705
Mean, Log Income of Kernels 9.943 10.221 10.220
Standard Deviation, Log Income of Kernels 1.141 .965 1.251
Mean, Maximum Income in Cluster (current $) 61,938 77,248 88,540
Mean, Minimum Income in Cluster (current $) 8,773 12,140 12,771
Per Cent in Northeast 25.4 25.4 28.1
Per Cent in Northwest 22.8 22.1 21.9
Per Cent in South 28.0 23.4 25.5
Per Cent in West 23.8 28.1 24.5
Per Cent in Central Cities 44.8 43.4 41.0
Per Cent in Suburbs (Urbanized Areas) 40.5 40.6 44.2
Per Cent in Suburbs (Other Urban Areas) 3.9 6.6 5.2
Per Cent in Rural and Non-metropolitan Areas 10.8 9.4 9.5
21TABLE 2: Neighborhood Sorting: 1985 AHS
Models Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Obs 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
LLF -4274 -4203 -4121 -4088 -4116 -4077 -4103 -4039 -3968 -3938 -3961 -3925
Geo. Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
mean 9.893 9.565 9.870 9.466 9.943 9.812 9.900 9.581 9.881 9.488 9.943 9.812
kernels (636.89) (114.00) (330.95) (66.38) (100.30) (15.78) (561.55) (101.00) (293.22) (59.32) (100.29) (15.75)
variance 1.668 1.578 1.722 1.623 1.297 1.154 1.767 1.672 1.821 1.719 1.297 1.154
kernels (172.74) (158.60) (66.81) (65.66) (24.67) (19.23) (161.09) (147.37) (60.50) (59.58) (24.37) (19.12)
mean 9.888 9.540 9.896 9.55
neighbors (233.69) (41.17) (228.12) (40.55)
variance 1.705 1.617 1.808 1.718
neighbors (74.08) (70.87) (70.10) (66.70)
correlation .391 .349 .353 .311 .387 .345 .342 .302
coeﬃcient (28.90) (21.94) (23.18) (17.21) (25.24) (19.18) (20.81) (15.45)
22TABLE 3
Neighborhood Sorting, Model 5: 1985, 1989 and 1993 AHS
Year 1985 1989 1993
Obs 232 244 309
LLF -3925 -3939 -5257
mean 9.812 9.859 9.768
kernels (15.75) (29.05) (14.48)
variance 1.154 .860 1.511
kernels (19.12) (11.26) (13.53)
mean 9.553 9.897 10.017
neighbors (40.55) (67.26) (84.40)
variance 1.718 1.503 1.590
neighbors (66.70) (67.54) (104.31)
correlation .302 .300 .163
coeﬃcient (15.48) (16.52) (9.15)
Regressions include dummy variables in the means for kernels and neighbors. The dummy
variables are for: US Census regions ( Northeast, Midwest and South), climatic regions (ﬁve cate-
gories), and degree of urbanicity ( central city of metropolitan area, suburb of metropolitan area,
and other suburb).
23TABLE 4
Neighborhood Sorting, Model 5, 1985: Northeast, Midwest, South and West
Region Northeast Midwest South West
Obs 59 53 65 55
LLF -1135 -756 -1100 -875
mean 9.730 9.816 10.182 9.696
kernels (27.79) (62.11) 94.48 (48.28)
variance 2.543 1.042 .677 1.807
kernels (7.38) (4.26) (4.60) (14.78)
mean 9.848 9.881 9.941 9.662
neighbors (66.55) (145.39) (116.12) (127.80)
variance 2.738 1.050 1.956 2.034
neighbors (19.60) (21.83) (23.03) (47.94)
correlation .378 .389 .389 .350
coeﬃcient (6.50) (8.77) (8.96) (14.48)
24TABLE 5
Neighborhood Sorting, Model 5, 1993: Northeast, Midwest, South and West
Region Northeast Midwest South West
Obs 87 68 79 76
LLF -1697 -1173 -1124 -1099
mean 10.052 10.318 10.357 10.182
kernels (20.88) (91.57) (88.34) (70.31)
variance 3.333 .752 .750 1.033
kernels (6.72) (4.85) (6.01) (6.28)
mean 10.288 10.233 10.286 10.313
neighbors (184.75) (178.07) (122.63) (165.78)
variance 2.229 1.810 1.193 1.099
neighbors (55.40) (54.00) (20.23) (27.40)
correlation .030 .172 .482 .385
coeﬃcient (1.08) (4.83 ) (12.46) (10.28)
25TABLE 6
Neighborhood Sorting, Model 5, 1985, by Urbanicity
Urbanicity Central City (MSA) Suburb (MSA) Other Suburb Rural and Non-metro
Obs 104 94 9 25
LLF -1880 -1363 -106 -489
mean 9.696 10.242 10.311 9.710
kernels (48.24) (91.27) (61.17) (46.35)
variance 1.807 .730 .180 1.015
kernels (14.65) (7.77) (1.00) (2.74)
mean 9.667 10.179 10.074 9.717
neighbors (126.10) (208.43) (83.38) (65.11)
variance 2.157 1.087 .657 2.901
neighbors (45.05) (40.75) (4.90) (22.42)
correlation .338 .319 .258 .213
coeﬃcient (13.02) (10.59) (1.57) (3.19)
26TABLE 7
Neighborhood Sorting, Model 5, 1993, by Urbanicity
Urbanicity Central City (MSA) Suburb (MSA) Other Suburb Rural and Non-metro
Obs 127 137 16 30
LLF -2255 -2109 -251 -557
mean 10.132 10.348 10.127 10.056
kernels (92.37) (37.37) (39.00) (58.62)
variance 1.091 2.233 .674 .805
kernels (8.96) (10.42) (2.06) (3.12)
mean 10.072 10.523 10.111 10.156
neighbors (191.96) (459.39) (77.97) (79.79)
variance 2.004 1.057 1.338 2.468
neighbors (49.19) (81.28) (15.24) (19.73)
correlation .270 .076 .241 .223
coeﬃcient (10.65) (3.24) (.03)) (2.70)
277 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Part A. The probability density function of income in neighborhood k is obtained as the
density of y; times the probability that `n² satisﬁes (7), given `ny: By assumption, the distribution
of `n² conditional on `ny; is normal with mean ¹² + ¾²
¾y¸(`ny ¡ ¹y); and variance ¾2
²(1 ¡ ¸2):
Then the probability distribution is given by the marginal distribution of `ny; weighted by the
mass of the doubly truncated distribution function of `n²; with lower and upper bounds deﬁned
by Equ. (7). The auxiliary variables Ωk and ! transform the truncation bounds in (7) in terms
of the standardized variate `n²
(1¡¸2)
1
2 ¾²
: The probability that `n² falls in that interval is given by
Φ(Zk(y)) ¡ Φ(Zk¡1(y)); which is a function of `ny: For the resulting expression to be a density
function it must integrate to 1, and thus the need for a normalizing constant Gk: Q.E.D. 2
Proof: Part B. (Sketch) The possibly multiple modes of fk(`ny) are identiﬁed by the zeroes of
the ﬁrst derivative of `n[fk(`ny)]: Taking logs of both sides of Equ. (9), diﬀerentiating the R.H.S.
of Equ. (9) with respect to `ny; and setting equal to 0 yields:
¡
`ny ¡ ¹y
¾2
y
+
1
p
2¼
e¡ 1
2(Zk)2
¡ e¡ 1
2(Zk¡1)2
Φ(Zk) ¡ Φ(Zk¡1)
! = 0:
We sketch the main intuition of the proof as follows. The ﬁrst term contributes to the derivative
a linear term with a negative slope:¡
`nY ¡¹y
¾2
y : By inspection of the second term, we see that it
contributes a complicated expression whose numerator is proportional to the diﬀerence of two
standardized normal densities, centered at Ωk
¡! and
Ωk¡1
¡! ; respectively. Referring to Figure 1, this
diﬀerence is magniﬁed between the modes of those standardized densities. Therefore, it is possible
that there are either one or three zeroes, of which the smallest and the largest correspond to
local maxima of the density function fk(`ny); which would characterize the two modes of the
distribution. Referring to Figure 1, we note that if ! < 0; which holds if ¸ > 0 (income and the
preference parameter ² are positively correlated), then the modes are indicated by the zeroes of
the derivative associated with points M¡
1 and M¡
2 . Similarly, if ! > 0; which requires that ¸ be
negative and absolutely larger than Ã; then the modes are indicated by M+
1 and M+
2 . If parameter
values eliminate any of the roots, it would be the two smallest roots. That is, if there is a single
root it is the one close to the mode of the national distribution. Q.E.D. 2
288 Appendix B: Maximum Likelihood Estimations
Let k = 1;:::;K denote neighborhoods, Yk; log income of kernel, and Ykj; j = 1;:::;jIkj; the log
incomes of neighbors of kernel k: For every neighborhood, deﬁne
MAXk = max
j
fYkjg;
MINk = min
j
fYkjg:
8.1 Model 0
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
LLF = ¡
1
2
"
(Yk ¡ ¹)2
¾2 + `n[2¼¾2]
#
¡
1
2
jIkj X
j=1
"
(Ykj ¡ ¹)2
¾2 + `n[2¼¾2]
#
(17)
where ¹;¾2; are the unknown mean and variance, common for neighbors and kernel, to be estimated.
8.2 Model 1
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
LLF = ¡
1
2
"
(Yk ¡ ¹)2
¾2 + `n[2¼¾2]
#
¡
1
2
jIkj X
j=1
"
(Ykj ¡ ¹ ¡ ½(Yk ¡ ¹))2
¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
+ `n[2¼¾2(1 ¡ ½2)]
#
(18)
where ¹;¾2;½ are the unknown mean and variance, and correlation coeﬃcient between neighbors
and kernel to be estimated.
8.3 Model 2
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
LLF = ¡
1
2
"
(Yk ¡ ¹ke)2
&2 + `n[2¼&2]
#
¡
1
2
jIkj X
j=1
"
(Ykj ¡ ¹ne ¡ ½¾
& (Yk ¡ ¹ke))2
¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
+ `n[2¼¾2(1 ¡ ½2)]
#
(19)
29where ¹ke;¹ne;&2;¾2;½ are the unknown mean for kernels and for neighbors, and variance for kernels
and for neighbors, and correlation coeﬃcient between neighbors and kernel to be estimated.
8.4 Model 3
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
LLF = ¡
1
2
"
(Yk ¡ ¹)2
¾2 + `n[2¼¾2]
#
¡
1
2
jIkj X
j=1
"
(Ykj ¡ ¹)2
¾2 + `n[2¼¾2]
#
(20)
¡
jIkj X
j=1
`n
·
Φ
µ
(MAXk ¡ ¹)
¾
¶
¡ Φ
µ
(MINk ¡ ¹)
¾
¶¸
where Φ(¢) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and ¹;¾2; are the unknown mean
and variance, common for neighbors and kernel, to be estimated.
8.5 Model 4
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
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where Φ(¢) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and ¹;¾2;½ are the unknown
mean, variance, common for neighbors and kernel, and correlation coeﬃcient between neighbors
and kernel, to be estimated.
8.6 Model 5
The LLF deﬁned for each kernel and its neighbors:
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where Φ(¢) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and ¹ke;¹ne;&2;¾2;½ are the
unknown means for kernels and for neighbors, and variance for kernels and for neighbors, and
correlation coeﬃcient between neighbors and kernel to be estimated.
319 Appendix C:
Comparison of Incomes between American Housing Survey and National Data
by Regions, 1985 and 1993
Sample: Kernels and Neighbors
U.S.- designated statistics are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States [U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1987; 1995)] and apply to the entire U.S. and regions, as appropriate, and
not just urban areas. U.S. median housing costs and property values also apply to the entire U.S.
and regions and are obtained from the AHS [U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985; 1993)]. All other
statistics are based on the author’s own processing of the American Housing Survey data [U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1996)].
Year 1985 1993
Regions All Mid North All Mid North
SMSAs West East South West SMSAs West East South West
Summary Statistics
Mean Income ($) 29410 26658 31140 28934 30928 37490 34085 41001 35893 39470
CV Income .846 .818 .858 .859 .827 .854 .849 .850 .874 .819
Median Income ($) 23000 21700 24000 22145 24565 28248 26000 30075 26312 30336
U.S. Mean Income ($) 29066 28149 31146 27044 31475 41428 39442 45319 38249 45284
U.S. Median Income ($) 23618 23551 25485 21397 25782 31241 31400 33747 28441 33739
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